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The Labor Injunction-Weapon or Tool?
by Robert M. Debevec*
A. Definition.
A N INJUNCTION is an order or writ issued by a court of equity
commanding an individual or group of individuals to do or
refrain from doing certain acts.1 These certain acts may pertain
to any one of a variety of matters. Here we are concerned only
with the injunction as it is applied to labor organizations or in-
dividuals to prevent them from doing or cause them to do certain
acts in their relationship to management. Whether these acts
are lawful or unlawful is the point which decides whether or not
an injunction will be allowed.
The question arises as to who has jurisdiction in an injunc-
tion hearing. Under Article III of the Constitution, the Federal
Court has judicial powers in all controversies in which the United
States is a party and in all cases between citizens of different
states.
Supreme Court interpretations of Acts of Congress are par-
tially the reason that most important labor controversies have
been tried in Federal Courts. For instance, the Sherman Act
2
was interpreted to include labor as well as capital when deter-
mining if an organization was a combination and/or a conspiracy.
3
As this Act provided that a combination formed to restrain trade
or interstate commerce was illegal, the Federal Courts assumed
jurisdiction in all cases involving interstate commerce.
This attitude brings up many interesting questions: does
picketing restrain interstate commerce; does paying strike bene-
fits restrain interstate commerce; is use of a union label, member-
ship in a union, striking and boycotting restraining commerce?
The early history of the use of the injunction in labor disputes
* The writer, a third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School, has
had several articles published in national magazines. He is at present the
Clerk of Court at Euclid Municipal Court. His undergraduate work was
done at John Carroll University and Cleveland College.
1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 549.
2 Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, par. 1-8, 26 Stat. 209; Amended 3-3-11, c. 231,
36 Stat. 1167, Act of Aug. 17, 1937, c. 690, 50 Stat. 693. U. S. Code, title 15,
par. 1-7, 15.
3 United States vs. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans,
54 F. 994, 26 LRA 158; Loewe vs. Lawlor (1908), 208 U. S. 274; Lawlor vs.
Loewe (1915), 235 U. S. 522, 35 S. Ct. 170.
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shows that the Federal Courts have usually held in the affirma-
tive.4
There are three general types of injunction:
1) The Temporary Restraining Order. This temporary re-
straining order was originally granted in a proceeding in which
the union or other party defendant received no notice and had
no opportunity to be heard. A sworn complaint was filed by the
plaintiff and affidavits of witnesses to the alleged complaint were
also filed. This was considered sufficient procedure to have a
temporary restraining order issued.
2) The Temporary Injunction. The plaintiff fied a motion
for temporary injunction and the defendant received notice to
appear and show cause why the injunction should not be issued.
Affidavits were filed by both parties involved.
3) The Permanent Injunction. After a temporary injunction
was granted the case was set down for trial and the complaint was
either dismissed or a permanent injunction was issued. Either
party could appeal to a higher court and often the final decision
was made in the United States Supreme Court.
In other words an injunction may be the end sought in an
action (permanent) or it may be a remedy employed in the ac-
tion to maintain a status while a case is pending to make the final
judgment worth while to the plaintiff. (Temporary.) The only
difference between the restraining order and the temporary in-
junction is that the former is an order issued ex parte (no hear-
ing of the defendant) while the latter shows the defendant what
this order is.
The crippling effects of an injunction to a strike can readily
be seen. The issuance of a restraining order or temporary in-
junction requires that the situation revert to its former status.
This meant for many years that picketing, strike pay benefits
and appealing to the public was banned-and even if the final
injunction was not allowed after a trial, the litigation usually was
so prolonged that the most important element of a strike, namely
speed, and therefore the strike itself, was lost.5
4 Gompers vs. Buck Stove and Range Co. (1911), 221 U. S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492.
5 Duplex Printing Co. vs. Deering (1921), 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172.
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B. History and Background.
An examination of the history of the injunction shows that it
is an ancient device used centuries ago in the British Courts of
Chancery to avoid the threat or continuance of an irreparable
injury to land. However it became convenient as time went on
to term as "property" other interests which were deemed to need
protection. 6
Many modern issues with their newer complications became
hidden under the misleading simplicity of old terms. As modern
law is evolved over the years, the fact is often overlooked that
present day conditions are not the same as they were when the
law was originally made. Thus the later courts began to take
the viewpoint that "property" was always meant to include busi-
ness rights and the right to acquire property and conduct a busi-
ness. Nothing could be further from the truth.
This concept is pointed out in the Supreme Court decision
in the International News Service vs. Associated Press case in
1918:7 "The rule that a court of equity concerns itself only in the
protection of property rights treats any civil rights of a pecuniary
nature as a property right ... and the right to acquire property
by honest labor or the conduct of a lawful business is as much
entitled to protection as the right to guard property already ac-
quired."
Thus the term "property" and its connotations became the
nucleus which saw the build-up of the labor injunction as a
powerful and devastating weapon on the part of employers in the
United States.
One of the first cases in which management attempted to
apply the injunction against labor in the United States was in
New York in the Johnston Harvester Co. vs. Meinhardt case in
1880. s The courts held, however, that the facts found did not
show any wrongful conduct on the part of the strikers.
This case proved to be a springboard for the injunction be-
cause from it the employers soon learned how to present their
cases and the type of evidence required by the courts. The court
had held that if the acts described by the complainant in this case
6 Springhead Spinning Co. vs. Riley (1868), L. R. Eq. 551.
7 248 U. S. 387.
8 (N. Y. 1880) 60 How. Pr. 168.
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(enticing laborers from the plaintiff's shops) were proved to be
unlawful, an injunction would be proper relief.
Management attorneys soon became adept in proving these
points and the injunction boom was on in full force.
C. Injunction Under the Sherman Act.
The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Pullman
strike of 1894 removed any doubt as to the availability of the
injunction in labor controversies.
This was the famous case of U. S. vs. Debs9 and was the re-
sult of a strike called by the employees of the Pullman Car Co.
who were affiliated with the American Railway Union. Some of
the facts in this case are presented here to show how the Supreme
Court's concept of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was used to fur-
ther government by injunction.
The Pullman Car Co. employees had walked out of the plant
(beating Mr. Pullman's plan to lock them out by a few hours)
because of the company's failure to reduce rent on company-
owned housing and especially because of the firing of three mem-
bers of the union's grievance committee.
After unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a settlement with
the company, the strikers requested that the American Railway
Union order a sympathy strike.
Eugene Debs, head of the American Railway Union an-
nounced a boycott on Pullman cars on June 25, 1894, refusing
to allow members of his union to inspect, switch or haul these
cars on any railroad.
The railroad officials countered by discharging all employees
who refused to haul Pullman cars and also by attaching mail cars
to Pullman cars so that when a Pullman car was cut out, the mail
car was automatically cut out. These moves resulted in a general
strike against the railroads and prepared the way for federal in-
terference.
On July 2, 1894, the attorney general filed a complaint charg-
ing the American Labor Union and Eugene Debs with a con-
spiracy to interfere with and restrain regular transportation, ob-
struct transportation of the U. S. mails and prevent the employ-
ment of persons.
9 (C. C. N. D. 111. 1894) 64 F. 724 (1895), 158 U. S. 564; 15 S. Ct. 900; 39
L. Ed. 1092.
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On these grounds (later held to be a conspiracy to restrain
interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act)
a temporary injunction was secured in the U. S. Circuit Court
for the Northern District of Illinois forbidding the union to inter-
fere with the business of the railroads entering Chicago, carry-
ing U. S. mails or engaged in interstate commerce. 10
When the injunction was issued, President Cleveland was
persuaded to send Federal troops to the scene. The presence qf
these troops and hired deputies of the railroads provoked rioting
on the strike scene.
Debs and other union leaders were arrested and indicted on
contempt charges for violating the injunction by causing rioting
and attempting to provoke a general strike in Chicago." The
strike was officially called off on August 5, 1894.
When the decision of the lower courts on the legality of the
injunction and indictments was upheld by the Supreme Court in
189512 the use of the injunction as a weapon against strikes re-
ceived great impetus. Its use was broadened as Justice Brewer
in his official opinion defined property to mean not only "physical
property" but any intangible right including employer-employee
relationship, merchant-customer relationship and mail passage or
shipment of goods in interstate commerce.13
While this strike ended disastrously for labor and caused the
injunction to be used more extensively in labor disputes, sub-
sequent investigation of means and methods used by railroad
officials to accomplish their ends in this case caused the beginning
of a more tolerant public policy towards labor. The labor policy
in the Democratic Party platform of 1896 stated: "We denounce
arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in local affairs as a
violation of the Constitution of the United States and a crime
against free institutions . . . and we especially object to govern-
ment by injunction as a new and highly dangerous form of oppres-
sion by which Federal judges in contempt of the laws of the states
and the rights of citizens, become at once legislators, judges and
executioners." 14
10 (C. C. N. D. Il. 1895) 65 F. 210.
11 U. S. vs. Debs, 65 F. 210.
12 In Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564.
13 In Re Debs, supra, at page 577.
14 "Unions Before the Bar," p. 42, Lieberman, New York Harper, 1950.
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Labor, of course, learned to hate and fear the injunction.
Before 1914 there was no legislation to curb or restrict its use.
Labor feared that its indiscriminate use would result in the loss
of the rights of labor, especially the right to strike, because a
judge could restrain a union from either calling a strike or con-
ducting it. The decision to grant or deny an injunction rested
solely upon the discretion or prejudice of the individual judge.
D. Injunction Under the Clayton Act.
The Clayton Act, passed in 1914, had some provisions in it
concerning labor and the injunction:
1) The most important was Section 6 which declared that
the labor of human beings was not a commodity or article of
commerce and courts were forbidden to interpret the anti-trust
laws to prevent the existence of unions nor that unions were a
conspiracy in restraint of trade.
2) Unless the affidavit filed by the plaintiff showed specific
facts that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage would
result to the complainant, no preliminary injunction (restraining
order) could be issued without notice. A temporary restraining
order expired in ten days unless heard and acted upon within
that time.
3) No restraining order could issue unless the plaintiff gave
bond.
4) Every injunction or restraining order had to specifically
and in detail give the reason for its issuance and was binding
only upon the actual parties to the suit, their officers, agents,
servants and employees.
5) An injunction or restraining order could be granted in a
dispute between employer and employee, between employees or
between union members and job-seekers when terms or con-
ditions of employment were involved only if it could be proved
in detail that irreparable injury for which there was no lawful
recourse was threatened. If the injunction was issued it could
not forbid work stoppage or peaceful encouragement of work
stoppage. It could not prevent payment of strike benefits nor the
-right of strikers to meet and discuss the situation. 15
15 Act of Oct. 15, 1914, C. 323, par. 1, 38 Stat. 730. U. S. Code, title 15, par. 12
et seq.; title 29, c. 5, par. 52.
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This Act was hailed as the answer to labor's dilemma in at-
tempting to carry out its legitimate functions and aims. Samuel
Gompers, president of the A. F. L., declared that it was the In-
dustrial Magna Charta.16
Labor's jubilance was shortlived, however. In the very first
case argued under this Act before the Supreme Court of the
United States, the decision went to the plaintiff. This was the
Duplex Printing Press Co. vs. Deering case. 17
This strike was called in August, 1913; an ex parte injunction
was obtained in April, 1914, and the final decision was handed
down by the United States Supreme Court in January, 1921. This
delay in itself was disastrous to the individual strike, but the real
blow to labor was the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Clay-
ton Act. This high court held that the intention of Congress in
writing the Act was to purposely make certain sections of it
ambiguous so that labor would believe it was achieving a far
reaching instrument for its protection whereas actually there was
no change in the existing state of affairs. The strike, boycott, etc.
was still a restraint of interstate commerce and illegal by this
judicial interpretation.
The decision in this case led to many other judicial findings
which completely destroyed the benefits of this Act for labor.
E. The Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Labor organizations started a new campaign for further clear-
cut legislation to limit the use of the injunction in labor disputes.
This agitation finally resulted in the passage of the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act of 1932, known as the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' 8
An unusual feature of this Act was that the public policy of
the United States in regard to the employer-employee relation-
ship and labor controversies was definitely defined.
This declaration of policy by the Congress was put into the
Act as a guide to the courts in their interpretations of it. This
was to prevent the recurrence of the unusual interpretations by
the courts of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The judiciary was
no longer required to decide what the intent of the Congress was
in writing the law.
16 "Prentice-Hall Labor Course," par. 1043, page 1023, 1950, Prentice-Hall,
Inc.
17 (1921) 254 U. S. 443; 41 S. Ct. 172.
is Act of March 2, 1932, c. 90, 47 Stat. 70, U. S. Code, Title 29, sec. 101 et seq.
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The policy declaration established labor's right to collective
bargaining and the legality of unions and collective bargaining.
The Act curbed the power of the Federal courts to issue in-
junctions and prescribed specific procedures to follow. The bill
did not take away the power to issue injunctions when an un-
lawful act, violence or fraud was being enacted.
Although the Act only restricted the power of injunction in
the Federal Courts, many states adopted a similar policy in their
legislatures. A Federal Court has jurisdiction when the parties
involved live in different states or when a question involving
rights under the Constitution of the United States arises. The
Federal Court does not have jurisdiction unless the amount in-
volved is over $3,000.00.
Under Section 4 of the Act, no court of the United States has
jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or temporary injunction
or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
a labor dispute, to prohibit any person or group of persons par-
ticipating in or interested in such dispute from doing either in-
dividually or together any of the following acts:
1) Ceasing or refusing to work or remain employed.
2) Being a member of any labor or employer organization.
3) Paying or withholding strike or unemployment benefits.
4) Aiding, lawfully, any person involved in any labor dis-
pute lawsuit.
5) Picketing not accompanied by fraud or violence.
6) Assembling peacefully to promote an interest in a labor
dispute.
7) Giving intent to do any of the above acts.
8) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of
the above acts.
9) Advising, urging, inducing or causing to do any of the
above specified acts without fraud, violence or threats.
Under section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act the following
conditions must be met before a temporary or permanent in-
junction may be granted in a labor dispute:
1) Both parties and their witnesses must be heard in open
court.
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol4/iss2/4
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2) Cross examination of both sides must be allowed.
3) An unlawful act will be or has been committed by the
defendant of irreparable injury of which the complainant has no
relief from the law.
It is required that proper notice be given to the defendant
unless the plaintiff under oath testifies that he will suffer irrepar-
able injury to his property if a notice is given. In this case a tem-
porary restraining order may be issued for five days but the
plaintiff is required to file a bond sufficient to cover all of the
defendant's expenses if the injunction is found to be unjustified.
Section 13 of this Act is interesting in that it defines a "labor
dispute" as any controversy concerning conditions of employ-
ment regardless of whether or not the parties involved are em-
ployer or employee. Early decisions under this Act interpreted
section 13 to mean that it did not apply to disputes between em-
ployee unions to which the employer was not a real party.19 Later
decisions interpreted it to indicate that the disputes did not have
to arise between those who stood in the proximate relationship
of employer and employee. 20
One of the most famous cases involving an injunction under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was the United States vs. John L.
Lewis case in 1946.21
After the Second World War, many strikes broke out as
labor organizations attempted to raise wage levels to meet the
rising cost of living. In April, 1946, the United Mine Workers
under John L. Lewis failed to report for work, although no official
strike was called. This occurred while Lewis and the mine
operators were attempting to negotiate a new agreement. No
coal was produced in April. On May 4, President Truman de-
clared that the coal dispute was a national disaster. He tried to
have the dispute submitted to arbitration, but both parties re-
jected this suggestion.
The mines were seized under the Smith-Connally Act,2 2 on
May 21 and the government took over their operation. A week
19 United Electric Coal Co. vs. Rice (7 Circ. 1925), 80 F. (2d) 1, cert. denied,
297 U. S. 714, 56 S. Ct. 500.
20 Senn vs. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5 (1937), 301 U. S. 468,
57 S. Ct. 857; Lauf vs. G. Shinner and Co. (1938), 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578.
21 67 S. Ct. 677.
22 Executive Order No. 9728, May 21, 1946, U. S. Code Cong. Service, 1946,
p. 1803; War Labor Disputes Act, par. 1-11, 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix, par.
1501-1511.
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later the government entered into an agreement with the United
Mine Workers with the provision that the agreement was to last
as long as the government was in possession.
In October, 1946, Lewis requested that the contract be re-
opened for further negotiations. The government refused to
negotiate. It held that the agreement was in effect as long as the
mines were under governmental control.
Lewis informed the government that their contract would be
terminated on November 20, 1946. On November 18, the govern-
ment served the union and John L. Lewis personally with a tem-
porary injunction issued by Justice T. Alan Goldsborough of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, re-
straining them from breaking their agreement, pending a hearing
before the court.
The union ignored the order and the workers stayed away
from the mines on November 20. The government petitioned
that Lewis and the union be punished for contempt of court for
violating the injunction.
The union held that under the Norris-LaGuardia Act this
was a labor dispute as defined in that Act and therefore the court
had no power to issue an injunction.
Justice Goldsborough held that this Act was not meant to
apply to the government when it was in the role of an employer.
He found that the defendants were guilty of contempt and fined
the United Mine Workers $3,500,000 and John L. Lewis $10,000.
On January 14, 1947, the case was argued on appeal before
the United States Supreme Court.23
The Supreme Court ruled that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
prohibited the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes involving
"persons" in their relationship as employers and employees but
the government could not be considered in the same position as
private persons or employers. Hence the Norris-LaGuardia Act
did not apply. The fine against the union was reduced to $700,000
but Lewis' fine of $10,000 was allowed.
The dissenting Court opinions stated that this was a labor
dispute and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should apply because
the Act did not specifically exclude the government from the role
of employer. However, the majority, five to four, ruled that the
Act was not applicable in this case.
23 U. S. vs. John L. Lewis, supra.
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F. The Taft-Hartley Act.
In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act 24 was formulated and made law
by Congress. Several provisions were made in this Act concern-
ing injunctions:
1) All secondary boycotts are prohibited and can be made
the grounds for an injunction.
2) The National Labor Relations Board may seek injunc-
tions to stop unfair labor practice by a union or employer and
must seek injunctions against all secondary boycotts and some
jurisdictional disputes. The court may grant such injunctions
without regard to any anti-injunction statutes. The statutes re-
ferred to are the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
3) When a strike which may imperil the national health or
safety is threatened, the president may apply for an eighty-day
injunction.
G. Summary and Conclusions.
The history of the labor injunction follows closely the history
of labor's struggle for organization and legal recognition.
When injunctions were first used so freely in the United
States, the beliefs of many judges and other citizens were based
on the old concept of master-servant relationship in which the
servant had few rights.
Public opinion gradually came to recognize that labor had
rights of its own and this was reflected in the passage of such
laws as the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Judicial opinion was slower to react to the change in the
status of labor. This was shown in the interpretations of these
Acts. The laws were used to block the activities of the unions
on the grounds that either the ends sought or the means used
in a particular strike were unlawful interference with interstate
commerce. This blocking was done through the use of the labor
injunction.
The courts finally had to be guided through the intricacies of
law interpretation without prejudice, by the passing of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act which left little doubt that labor and its unions
had certain rights which could not be disregarded by judicial
whim.
24 Public Law 101--80th Congress, Chapter 120-1st Session-H. R. 3020.
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As the unions increased in power and prestige, use of the
labor injunction declined.
The injunction has lost its power as a weapon of the em-
ployer over the employee. The judicial powers have been care-
fully narrowed and defined so that controversies over interpreta-
tions of the law are not so frequent. Labor's rights are now
clearly enumerated and pecuniary penalties for wrongfully
brought injunctions has caused them to become as unpopular
with management as they formerly were with labor.
Anti-injunction laws benefit both management and labor in
the long run because without the threat of the injunction hang-
ing over it, labor can afford to relax its defensive attitude towards
management. Realizing that it is no longer forced to compete
with the law as well as management, it can attempt to under-
stand and analyze some of the employer's problems.
The employer is forced by law to recognize the legality of
the union and must realize that the success of his enterprise is
dependent on mutual co-operation.
The employer and employee must, because of their positions,
regard each other with an air of friendly antagonism. However,
when it is known that there is no powerful third party taking
sides with one against the other it is possible to negotiate in-
telligently, logically and openly.
Since injunctive bargaining is no longer the fashion, collec-
tive bargaining becomes the logical answer for both factions.
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